Turkey’s burgeoning strategic relationship with Pakistan raises nuclear concerns. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, in an address on September 4 this year to his ruling Justice and Development Party’s governing body, spoke openly of his country’s nuclear ambitions.
“Some countries have missiles with nuclear warheads, not one or two. I, however, am not supposed to have missiles with nuclear warheads. This, I cannot accept,” the Turkish leader said. “And right next to us, there is Israel, right? With everything [it has], it is frightening [other countries].”
Turkey already has the major elements for acquiring a nuclear capability – rich uranium deposits, and the TR-1 and TR-2 Research Reactors maintained by the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority.
The greatest challenge in acquiring a nuclear weapons capacity is obtaining fuel. A civilian nuclear power program, as in the Iranian case, can often serve as a ruse for making that fuel and building a clandestine nuclear arsenal.
Turkey is currently building its first major reactor to generate electricity with Russian help. The Russian Rosatom company in September won a $20 billion contract to build four civilian nuclear reactors in Akkuyu, on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast.
Turkey, meanwhile, has over the decades shown great interest in learning the formidable skills needed to purify uranium as well as to turn it into plutonium, the two main fuels needed.
Ankara’s strong and burgeoning strategic ties to Pakistan are causing international concern regarding the possibility of a transfer of nuclear weapons knowledge between the two countries.
Turkey already has the will and the raw materials. This knowledge is the factor it currently lacks.
In the 2000s, Turkey was a covert industrial hub for the nuclear black market of rogue Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. Khan’s network offered buyers a menu of both technical expertise and the materials to make a bomb. The electronics parts of the centrifuges, the most important items in this covert trade, were from Turkey, according to a recent report in The New York Times.
Centrifuges, whose name has become familiar to the broader public because of the Iranian nuclear effort, spin at supersonic speeds to purify uranium. Their output, depending on the level of enrichment, can fuel reactors or nuclear weapons.
According to “Nuclear Black Markets,” a report on the Khan network by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, companies in Turkey aided the covert effort by importing materials from Europe, making centrifuge parts and shipping finished products to customers – Iran, Libya and North Korea.
A riddle to this day is whether the Khan network had a fourth customer. A former German defense official quoted in The New York Times on October 24 this year noted that Turkey could possess “a considerable number of centrifuges of unknown origin.”
The idea that Ankara could be the fourth customer “does not appear far-fetched,” he added.
These concerns regarding a possible emergent Turkey-Pakistan nuclear link exist within the context of an acknowledged emergent strategic alliance between these countries.
read the rest of this analysis in the Jerusalem Post